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International Paper and Interstate
Water Pollution: A Two-Ton Problem
in a One-Ton Regulatory Garbage Bag
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(the Act) in 1948.1 The original Act was deficient in many
respects, 2 and in 1972 Congress restructured it into "a compre-
hensive program for controlling and abating water pollution." 3
Congress set as its ultimate goal the total elimination of "pol-
lutants in the navigable waters of the United States." ' 4 The 1972
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (current
version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (commonly referred to as
the Clean Water Act). The Act was revised several times after 1948. See annotation
following 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West 1986).
2 The Act required each state to set its own water quality standards, and the
Secretary of Interior was then supposed to approve or reject each state's plan. The
program proved ineffective. In EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control
Bd., 426 U.S. 100 (1976), the Supreme Court commented: "The problems stemmed from
the character of the standards themselves, which focused on the tolerable effects rather
than the preventable causes of water pollution, from the awkwardly shared federal and
state responsibility for promulgating such standards, and from the cumbrous enforcement
procedures." Id. at 202. When drafting the 1972 Amendments, the Senate Public Works
Committee concluded that "the national effort to abate and control water pollution...
ha[d] been inadequate in every vital aspect .. " S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADMIN. NEws 3668, 3674.
A more detailed description of the features of the Act prior to 1972 is beyond the
scope of this Comment. See generally 426 U.S. at 203-04; McThenia, An Examination
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 30 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 195, 198-202 (1973); Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollution: Statutory
Preemption or Preservation, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 500, 503 (1981).
Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37 (1975).
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1986). The drafters intended for the Amendments to
provide three essential elements: (1) uniformity - through uniform national standards
of effluent limitations imposed upon certain categories of industries and municipalities;
(2) finality - by setting specific goals; and (3) enforceability - by means of a discharger
permit program. See R. LUKEN, E. PECHAN, WATER POLLUTION CONTROL - ASSESSING
THE IMPACTS AND COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS, 1-8 (1977).
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Amendments reflected Congress' "continuing attempt to balance
an industrial society's need to consume natural resources and
dispose of waste materials with its desire to protect personal
health, safety, and property." 5
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 (1972 Amendments) 6 established a regulatory system which
attacks water pollution primarily by imposing effluent limitations
7
on all point sources' of pollutant discharges. 9 The National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit pro-
gram operates as the primary enforcement mechanism. 0 The
federal government and the individual states share the respon-
siblity for administering the program." Congress believed that
the program's joint administrative feature would offer states a
"significant role in protecting their own natural resources. 1 2
In reality, the Act and its 1972 Amendments have compro-
mised the states' ability to deal adequately with water pollution
5 Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134
U. PA. L. REv. 121, 123 (1985).
6 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986)). For a more comprehensive description of the 1972 Amendments, see Smith,
Highlights of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 77 DICK.
L. REv. 459 (1973).
7 An "effluent limitation" is "any restriction established by a State or the
Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological,
and other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters
33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
A "point source" is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance ...
from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
9 A "pollutant" is "dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, gar-
bage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive ma-
terials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial,
municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). A "discharge of pollutant" is "any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source.. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
1o See infra text accompanying notes 17-26.
" 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing "federal agencies shall
co-operate with State and local agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent,
reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing water resources").
See also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), (d), 1370 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
12 International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 486 (1987). See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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from sources outside their borders. The problem arises when
one state's territory is polluted by effluents discharged from a
source in another state, despite the source's compliance with its
federally approved discharge permit.' 3 Courts have found the
ambiguous saving clauses 14 of the Act difficult to interpret and
apply in these interstate pollution cases. This inherent problem
has generated considerable litigation, 5 culminating in the United
States Supreme Court's holding in International Paper Company
v. Ouellette.
16
This Comment examines International Paper and its impli-
cations. The Comment begins with a discussion of the regulatory
framework and the remedy provisions of the Clean Water Act.
A brief examination of significant prior cases reveals the diffi-
culties courts experienced in attempting to interpret and apply
the Act's remedy provisions. The Comment then analyzes the
International Paper opinion and partial dissent, and concludes
that it demonstrates that problems and inequalities are built into
the Act's ambiguous remedy provisions, particularly in the con-
text of interstate pollution. The Comment finally suggests a
practical statutory solution to the problem.
I. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. The NPDES Permit Program
Under the Clean Water Act, any party planning to discharge
pollutants into a navigable body of water must obtain a permit
issued either through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
"1 See Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts: The Role of the Federal Courts, 6
HARv. ENVT'L. L. REV. 241, 260-63 (1982). See generally Comment, The Dilemma of
the Downstream State: The Untimely Demise of Federal Common Law Nuisance [here-
inafter Dilemma], 11 B.C. ENVT'L. AF. L. REV. 297 (1983-84).
14 See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
" See e.g., cases cited infra notes 51, 54. See also e.g., Love v. New York State
Dept. of Envtl. Conserv., 529 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Hands v. Costle, 501 F.
Supp. 195 (E.D. Va. 1980); Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Virginia State Water, 495
F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Va. 1980); United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th
Cir. 1977).
479 U.S. 482 (1987).
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or through an approved state permit program.' The permit sets
specific effluent discharge limitations for the applicant.' The
issuance of a permit officially certifies that the applicant's pro-
posed discharge plan falls within the guidelines set by the EPA.19
Before the permit is issued, the permit issuing agency must
notify other states whose land or waters might be affected by
the discharge. 20 Those states may object or recommend changes
2'
to the permit's specifications at a public hearing. 22 Notwithstand-
ing these protective devices, a complaining state is in a "subor-
dinate position ' 2a because the issuing agency is free to reject the
affected state's recommendations. 2 4 The complaining state's only
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)-(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The Act makes it
illegal for anyone to discharge pollutants without a permit. Under the NPDES, the EPA
Administrator issues permits. The Administrator may delegate the permit issuing au-
thority to a state agency after approving the state's entire water pollution control
program. Should the party apply for a federal permit, the party first must be certified
by the state where the discharge will occur. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
The section provides:
Any applicant for a federal .. .permit to conduct any activity .. .which
may result in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the
S.. permitting agency a certification from the State in which the discharge
originates or will originate ... that any such discharge will comply with
the applicable provisions .... No license or permit shall be granted if
certification has been denied by the State ... or the Administrator, as the
case may be. Id.
See also Monongahela Power Co. v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Snyder v.
Callaghan, 284 S.E.2d 241 (W.Va. 1981).
Is 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)-(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
19 While the EPA guidelines set minimum standards that may not be lowered,
states may set higher standards for point sources within their borders. See 33 U.S.C. §§
1314(b), 1370 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(2), 1342(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 1342(b)
specifies the requirements to which a state permit agency must comply. Permits issued
directly by the EPA must also meet the requirements set out in Section 1342(b). 33
U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Further, the Act also requires a state to
notify and send a copy of each permit application to the Administrator. 33 U.S.C. §§
1342(b)(4), 1342(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2- 33 U.S.C. § 1342(bX5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1), (b)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2 International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 490 (1987) (also commenting
that an affected state has only an advisory role in regulating pollution that originates
beyond its borders).
14 See e.g., Tennessee v. Champion Int'l Corp., 709 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1986) cert.
granted, 479 U.S. 1061 (1987). "A duly authorized permit from the EPA or from an
authorized state should, and in our opinion, must, afford some protection to the holder
thereof, who frequently has obtained it at enormous expense." 709 S.W.2d at 576.
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recourse is to request the EPA to review and veto the permit. 25
In reality, the federal review of state permits has been rare.
26
B. Remedies Under the Act
The Clean Water Act concentrates on the regulatory aspects
of water pollution. 27 Accordingly, the Act contains two provi-
sions which deal specifically with permit violations. 28 Such viol-
ations can ultimately result in civil or criminal monetary penalties
which are paid to the federal government.
29
Notwithstanding the Act's comprehensive permit scheme,
pollution injuries continue to occur even when the discharger
has faithfully complied with its permit.30 In the interstate con-
text, the Act's remedy provisions are inadequate to fairly redress
such injuries.
Recognizing that injuries would occur, Congress included
two saving clauses3 in the Act which preserve (theoretically) an
injured party's right to compensation for water pollution inju-
ries. Because the provisions are vaguely worded, however, courts
have experienced great difficulty in applying them.
32
33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). But see 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing review of Administrator's decision in the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals).
Comment, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 356. See also Note, Adjudicatory Hear-
ings Under the NPDES, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 17, 30-32 (1980); but see Champion Int'l
Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 648 F. Supp. 1390 (S.D.N.C.
1986).
27 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. See generally Note, City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois: The Demise of the Federal Common Law of Water Pollution, 52 Wis. L.
REV. 627, 664-71 (1982) [hereinafter The Demise].
33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (government enforcement and
citizens suits, respectively).
29 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, No. 83-1065 (Mar. 4, 1985), slip op. 9 (providing that penalties are paid
to United States Treasury).
30 This consequence, of course, will continue to occur until pollution is eliminated
completely. Congress initially set 1985 as the target date for total elimination, but
extended the date to March 1, 1989 in the Water Quality Standard Act of 1987. As with
any problem of great magnitude (such as our federal budget deficit), pollution will
continue to plague the nation.
31 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e), 1370(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
12 See cases cited supra note 15.
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The section of the Act permitting "any citizen" to sue a
polluter or the Administrator3 3 contains a savings clause (Section
505(e)), which provides that "[n]othing in this section shall
restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may
have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of
any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief
(including relief against the Administrator or a state
agency). .... ,,34 Another savings clause (Section 510(2)), con-
tained in the section listing the powers of the states under the
Act, provides that "[n]othing in [the Act] shall be construed as
impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction
of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary
waters) of such States." 35
In drafting the Clean Water Act, Congress Was more con-
cerned with preventing water pollution than in redressing injuries
caused by water pollution.3 6 Therefore, Congress included the
Act's savings clauses to preserve existing statutory and common
law remedies, thereby maintaining the status quo. 37 Because of
the vagueness of the clauses, however, the courts have spent
33 33 U.S.C. § 1365(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) states the following:
[Any citizen may commence a civil action .. .(1) against any person ...
who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State
with respect to such a standard or limitation, or (2) against the Adminis-
trator where there is alleged failure of the Administrator to perform any
act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Admin-
istrator. Id.
, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
31 33 U.S.C. § 1370(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 1370(1) additionally
contains the following:
Nothing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State
. .. to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges
of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of
pollution; except that if an effluent limitation ... is in effect under this
chapter, such State ... may adopt or enforce any effluent limitation ...
which is less stringent than the effluent limitation ... under this chapter.
11 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 13-18 n. 27 (1981) (citing Senate Report containing statements made by senators
in 116 CONG. REC. 33100-33104 (1970)).
11 "[T]he section . . . specifically preserve[s] any rights or remedies under any
other law. Thus, if damages [can] be shown, other remedies ... remain available.
Compliance with requirements under this Act [are] not .. .a defense to a common law
action for pollution damages." S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADNIN. NEws 3668, 3746-47.
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more energy interpreting the clauses than applying them. Tra-
ditionally, the courts' difficulties in interpreting the clauses have
had two sources: (1) the problem of whether federal or state law
applies; and (2) if state law applies, the problem of whether the
source state's law or the affected state's law controls.
II. LITIGATION PRIOR TO International Paper
Parties injured by interstate water pollution traditionally have
turned to the federal court system for relief.3" The United States
Supreme Court, in the first part of the twentieth century, relied
in these cases almost exclusively on the federal common law of
public nuisance. 9
The climax and fall of the federal common law of water
pollution came about through a line of cases involving a dispute
between Milwaukee and Illinois over Milwaukee's excessive sew-
age pollution into Lake Michigan.4 This line of cases sets the
stage for International Paper.
A. Milwaukee I
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Milwaukee 1),41
Congress' frequent attempts to regulate water pollution are traced
31 See e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906) (stating "Before this
court ought to intervene the case should be of serious magnitude, clearly and fully
proved .. "). See infra text accompanying notes 41-48. See also New Jersey v. New
York City, 283 U.S. 473, 481-82 (1931); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365
(1923); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921). Cf. Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (an air pollution case in which the Supreme Court
recognized a state's quasi-sovereign interests in protecting its natural resources from
nuisances caused by out-of state sources).
19 See Glicksman, supra note 5, at 152-55. The author states that the Supreme
Court relied on federal common law to protect one state's natural resources from
invasion by another state, and to avoid or resolve disputes between the states." Id. at
152 (footnote omitted).
In many of the early twentieth century cases, the Supreme Court invoked its original
jurisdiction. However, in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), the
Court refused to exercise its original jurisdiction because of the complex facts of the
dispute. The court stated, "[A]n action such as this, if otherwise cognizable in federal
district court would have to be adjudicated under state law." Id. at 498 n.3 (citing Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court later overruled the case in Milwaukee
I.
', See infra notes 41-70 and accompanying text.
41 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (seeking injunction to abate excessive untreated sewage
dumped into Lake Michigan) [hereinafter Milwaukee 1].
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from the 1890s through the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act as it existed in 1971.42 The Court held that such legislation
demonstrated a sufficiently strong federal interest in controlling
and preventing water pollution to form a sufficient basis for
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331(a). 43
The Court further stated that the overriding federal interest in
interstate waters required that rules of decision in this area not
vary from state to state." The Court specifically held that federal
common law preempts state common law in interstate water
pollution disputes until "new federal laws and new federal re-
gulations ... pre-empt the ... federal common law of nui-
sance.' 4
After Milwaukee I, federal courts attempted to use the fed-
eral common law of nuisance to resolve interstate water pollution
disputes." However, because of the vagueness of the concepts
underlying nuisance law, 47 courts were unable to craft a uniform
method of utilizing nuisance law to resolve water pollution dis-
putes. 4 Before the courts could establish such a rule, Congress
passed the 1972 Amendments to the Act. 49
, Id. at 101-03.
Id. at 99-101. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) provides that "district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions ... aris[ing] under the Consti-
tution, laws, or treaties of the United States." In Milwaukee I, the Court quoted Texas
v. Pankey, 442 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971):
As the field of federal common law has been given necessary expansion
into matters of federal concern and relationship (where no applicable
federal statute exists, as there does not here), the ecological rights of a
State in the improper impairment of them from sources outside of the
State's own territory, now would and should, we think, be held to be a
matter having basis and standard in federal common law and so directly
constituting a question arising under the laws of the United States.
Id.
. 406 U.S. at 105 (quoting from Hinderlider v. LaPlata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938): "The question of apportionment of interstate waters is a question of 'federal
common law' upon which State statutes or decisions are not conclusive.").
,1 Id. at 107.
- See Note, The Demise, supra note 28, at 636-40.
4' See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
616 (5th ed. 1984) ("There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law
than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' ").
41 Rather than creating a uniform rule, the Supreme Court, in Milwaukee I,
proposed a case-by-case method. The Court stated that "federal courts will be empow-
ered to appraise the equities of ... suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water
pollution." Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 107.




The same dispute involved in Milwaukee P0 engendered City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan (Milwaukee I1)."1 Mil-
waukee II held that the Clean Water Act preempted federal
common law52 because Congress had "occupied the field through
the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program super-
vised by an expert administrative agency.""
In the same year, the Court also handed down Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Associ-
ation.m In National Sea Clammers, an association of shell fish-
ermen brought a class action against various government officials
and alleged permit violations under the Clean Water Act." The




Read together, Milwaukee II and National Sea Clammers
"eliminated all opportunities for private persons to seek damages
under federal law for injuries caused by activities regulated under
10 In Milwaukee I, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the United States
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Illinois thereafter filed a
complaint. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973). After four
years of discovery and pretrial motions, the case went to trial. After a four month trial,
the court made extensive technical findings and decided that Milwaukee's excessive
sewage dumping constituted a nuisance under federal common law. Id. at 299. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that part
of the district court's holding, 500 F.2d 151, 174 (7th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court
then granted certiorari to Milwaukee to determine the effect of the 1972 Amendments
in interstate water pollution disputes.
' 451 U.S. 304 (1981) [hereinafter Milwaukee 11].
I' /d. at 315-16 ("Our 'commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamen-
tal' to continue to rely on federal common law 'by judicially decreeing what accords
with "common sense and the public weal" ' when Congress has addressed the problem."
Quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978).
Id. at 317.
453 U.S. 1 (1981).
Id. at 1.
16 Id. at 22. Accord City of Evansville, Ind. v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc.,
604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Sierra Club v. SCM
Corp., 580 F. Supp. 862 (D.C.N.Y. 1984), aff'd 747 F.2d 99 (2nd Cir. 1984); City of
Philadelphia v. Stephan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Pruitt v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975.(E.D. Va. 1981).
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the Act."15 7 One question still remained, however. The Supreme
Court had not yet addressed the question of the extent to which
(if at all) the savings clauses had preserved state law.58 Milwaukee
H held only that the Clean Water Act had supplanted federal
common law. While Milwaukee II was pending in the Supreme
Court, the state of Illinois and several Illinois residents filed
property damage suits in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois alleging that municipalities in
Wisconsin and Indiana had polluted Lake Michigan.5 9
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee II), 60 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the first
appellate court to address the extent to which the Clean Water
Act permitted state common law to apply to interstate water
pollution injury disputes. Relying on the logic of Milwaukee I
and Milwaukee II, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the domi-
nance of federal interests in the area of interstate waterways.
6'
Because each affected state had competing and conflicting inter-
ests in a common body of water, the court concluded that the
controversy was "inappropriate for state law resolution. ' 62 The
comprehensive Clean Water Act was, therefore, a federal at-
tempt to govern interstate waters in the most uniform manner. 63
After demonstrating the continuing significance of Milwaukee I
and Milwaukee II, the Seventh Circuit concluded that federal
17 Glicksman, supra note 5, at 121.
11 Illinois' complaint also had sought relief under Illinois statutory and common
law. 366 F. Supp. at 300. The Court of Appeals ruled, pursuant to Milwaukee I, that
because federal common law controlled in the case, the state claims were not viable.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 177 n. 53 (7th Cir. 1979). The Supreme
Court subsequently denied Illinois' petition for certiorari on the issue of state claims.
451 U.S. at 982 (1981).
19 Three different actions were consolidated. For a helpful summary, see Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 404-06 (7th Cir. 1984).
- 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985) [hereinafter
Milwaukee III].
61 Id. at 407-09. See also supra text accompanying notes 38-54.
62 731 F.2d at 410. "There are legitimate state concerns on both sides of the
question .... There is a controversy of federal dimensions, implicating the conflicting
rights of states and inappropriate for state law resolution." Id.
63 Id. at 410-11. But see Stewart, supra note 13, at 261 ("uniform measures ...
do not come to grips ..." with problems).
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law governed interstate water pollution "except to the extent
that the . .. [Act] authorize[d] resort to state law." 64
The Seventh Circuit ultimately held that the Clean Water
Act preserved state law at least to the extent that an injured
party could seek redress under the law of the state where the
source of the pollution originated. 65 But the court also held that
the Act preempted the application of the laws of the state where
the pollution injury occurred. 66
The importance of Milwaukee III lies in the narrowness of
the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Clean Water Act's
two savings clauses. 67 The Seventh Circuit determined that the
savings clause dealing with the authority of the states merely
saved "the right and jurisdiction of a state to regulate activity
occurring within the confines of its boundary waters." '68 Like-
wise, the Court held that the savings clause which deals with the
rights of "any citizen," refers solely to rights under the law of
the state in which the discharge occurred. 69 The Court reasoned
that imposing the common law standards of multiple affected
states would "lead to a chaotic confrontation between sovereign
states," thereby "undermin[ing] the uniformity and state coop-
eration envisioned by the Act."
70
731 F.2d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 1984).
6 Id. at 414.
66 Id.
61 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
11 731 F.2d at 413 (determining a broader construction would cause "conflict and
confusion").
69 Id. at 414. The court noted the following:
[I]t seems implausible that Congress meant to preserve or confer any right
of the state claiming injury (State II) or its citizens to seek enforcement of
limitations on discharges in State I by applying the statutes or common
law of State II. Such a complex scheme of interstate regulation would
undermine the uniformity and state cooperation envisioned by the Act.
For a number of different states to have independent and plenary regulatory
authortiy over a single discharge would lead to chaotic confrontation
between sovereign states. Dischargers would be forced to meet not only
the statutory limitations of all states potentially affected by their discharges
but also the common law standards developed through case law of those
states. It would be virtually impossible to predict the standard for a lawful
discharge into an interstate body of water. Any permit issued under the
Act would be rendered meaningless. In our opinion Congress would not
have intended such a result. Id.
'0 Id.
1988-89l
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
III. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY V. OUELLETTE
A. Background
While Milwaukee III was pending in the Seventh Circuit, the
state of Vermont and a class of Vermont residents filed suit in
Vermont state court against International Paper Company, 1 who
promptly removed the case to the United States District Court
for the District of Vermont.
72
International Paper operated a paper mill in New York be-
side Lake Champlain. The plaintiff class, who lived on the
opposite shore, alleged that effluents from the paper mill were
interfering unreasonably with their use and enjoyment of their
property. The plaintiffs sought money damages and injunctive
relief.7 The defendants filed for a motion to dismiss.
74
The district judge, like the Seventh Circuit in Milwaukee III,
had to determine the preemptive scope of the Clean Water Act.
International Paper contended that the court should follow Mil-
waukee III and hold that the Clean Water Act's savings clauses
preserved only the laws of the state where the discharge oc-
curred. 75 The court declined to do so,76 adopting instead a much
broader interpretation, and holding that the savings clause did
preserve actions to redress interstate water pollution under the
law of the affected parties' state. 77 This holding reflected the
court's desire to allow a state to exercise police power over its
shores, despite the enactment of the comprehensive Act.
7
1
11 Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 479 U.S. 481, 484 (1987). The plaintiffs
owned or leased property in Vermont across Lake Champlain from International Paper's
paper mill. For a summary of prior litigation between these two parties, see Ouellette
v. International Paper Co., 86 F.R.D. 476 (1980).
72 Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264 (D. Vt. 1985), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
71 602 F. Supp. at 266. The complaint also contained an air pollution cause of
action. See Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 666 F. Supp. 58 (D. Vt. 1987).
74 602 F. Supp. at 266.
" Id. at 268. See supra text accompanying notes 59-69.
76 602 F. Supp. at 271-72.
77 Id. at 272 (basing decision on express language of saving clauses as well as
legislative history and stated objectives of Act).
7" The court also discredited Milwaukee Is holding, because it "create[d] a
choice-of-law rule that deviates without legislative authorization, from well-settled choice
of law principles." Id. at 270.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the decision 79 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve the conflict between the circuits. 8
B. Holding
In International Paper"' the Supreme Court concluded that
a court deciding a nuisance claim involving interstate water
pollution subject to the Clean Water Act "must apply the law
of the State in which the point source is located. ' 82 The Court
reasoned that the application of an affected state's law would
indirectly regulate a discharge acting in compliance with its
permit.83
By holding that no court could apply the law of the affected
state, the majority created a major exception to well-settled
conflict-of-law principles .84 Under traditional conflict-of-law
principles, "the affected State's nuisance law may be applied
when the purpose of the tort law is to ensure compensation of
tort victims. ' 85 In his partial dissent, Justice Brennan found that
the majority had misread Congressional intent in deviating from
well-settled law. He concluded: "I find that the Act's plain
language clearly indicates that Congress wanted to leave intact
the traditional right of the affected State to apply its own tort
law when its residents are injured by an out-of-state polluter.
'86
IV. ANALYSIS
International Paper finally settled the meanings of the Clean
Water Act's two savings clauses. The Seventh Circuit had read
them narrowly87 while the Second Circuit had read them broadly.
8
776 F.2d 55 (2nd Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
w International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 487 (1987).
81 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
"2 Id. at 481, 496 (emphasis added).
I3 d. at 813.
Id. at 502 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra notes 129-38 and accompanying
text.
Id. (footnote omitted).
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 504 (1987).
'7 See supra text accompanying notes 57-69.
" See supra text accompanying notes 71-80.
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The Supreme Court adopted the Seventh Circuit's narrow inter-
pretation, 9 which conclusively precludes a court from applying
the affected state's law to redress any private injury resulting
from activities subject to the Clean Water Act.
A. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court displaced the law of affected states
pursuant to general principles of federal preemption. 9° Before
the Court passed judgment on the Clean Water Act's preemptive
effect on state common law, the Court laid out some general
preemption principles. The Court began "with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be
[preempted] ...unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress." 91 When Congress has not expressly occupied a
field, the Court will determine whether Congress has implicity
preempted state law. One type of implicit preemption occurs
when a federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive that the Court
can reasonably infer "that Congress 'left no room' for supple-
mentary state regulation.
' 92
The Court must also determine whether the state law "ac-
tually conflicts with [the] .. .federal statutes." 93 One indication
of whether the federal and state laws conflict is if the state law
"interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was
designed to reach [its stated] goal." '94 As a result of these rules,
the federal law will displace the state law "only to the extent
necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of the [federal
act in question]." 95
9 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 295-
96 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter NowAK].
9, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
92 479 U.S. at 491 (quoting 331 U.S. at 230).
93 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
" 479 U.S. at 494 (1987) (citing Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural
Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984)).
91 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 496 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973)), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1140 (1985). See also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984)




In International Paper, the Supreme Court divided its pre-
emption analysis of the Clean Water Act into three parts. First,
it explained why the Act could preempt the affected state's laws
without disturbing the source state's law. 96 Second, the Court
demonstrated how the application of an affected state's laws
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purpose and objectives of Congress. '97 Finally, the
Court confirmed that "nothing in the Act bars aggrieved indi-
viduals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of
the source State."
'98
The Supreme Court first discredited a broad reading of the
savings clause, 99 holding that Congress intended the 1972
Amendments to the Act to "establish an all-encompassing pro-
gram of water pollution regulation."' 10 Notwithstanding the in-
clusion of the savings clause, Congress did not necessarily intend
the clauses to be read as general savings clauses.' 0' Congress
deliberately refrained from addressing private damage claims for
water pollution in the Clean Water Act. 10 2 At most, therefore,
the provisions indicate that Congress did not intend to leave an
injured party without some means of redress. A Senate Report
confirms this conclusion: "[I1f damages could be shown, other
remedies [in addition to a citizen suit] would remain available.
Compliance with requirements under this act would not be a
defense to a common law action for pollution damages. "103
When the Court stated its interpretation of the savings clauses,
it focused on their plain language. lt The Court interpreted the
savings clauses as follows:
See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
479 U.S. at 492 (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labora-
tories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)). See infra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.




02 See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 13-18 & n. 27 (1981).
103 S. REp. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3668, 3746-47.
1' 479 U.S. at 493. But see id. at 503 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
Section 510 also states "except as expressly provided," and Congress has not expressly
preempted any law).
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Section 505(e) merely says that 'nothing in this section' i.e. the
citizen-suit provision, shall affect an injured party's right to
seek relief under state law; it does not purport to preclude
preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act. Section
510, moreover, preserves the authority of a State 'with respect
to the waters (including boundary waters) of such State[ ].'
This language ... limits the effect of the clause to ...dis-
charge from within the State. 03
The Court seems to have placed little emphasis on the afore-
mentioned Senate Report. Instead, the Court examined the Clean
Water Act as a whole - including its purposes and history.'
°6
The Court concluded that "if affected States were allowed to
impose separate discharge standards on a single point source,
the inevitable result would be a serious interference with the
achievement of the 'full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.' " o
In addition to finding an express preemption of non-source
state law, the Court concluded that the Act also implicitly pre-
empted an affected state's laws. 0 8 In this part of the opinion
the Court focused on the Clean Water Act's primary enforce-
ment mechanism, the permit system. °9 The Court noted that
Congress established the permit system as the primary vehicle
for achieving the Clean Water Act's ultimate goal - elimination
of water pollution."0 A permit may issue only after many com-
plex decisions have been made by the EPA Administrator and
by a source state's permit granting agency."' Because of the
1o 479 U.S. at 493. The Court adopted this narrow interpretation of the clauses in
part in Milwaukee II when it held that the Act preempted federal common law. Mil-
waukee II, 451 U.S. at 399. For a critical analysis of the Court's interpretation of the
clauses in Milwaukee II, see Glicksman, supra note 5, at 159-67.
479 U.S. at 493.
"o Id. at 493-94.
Id. at 496-97.
109 See supra text accompanying notes 17-27.
..o 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 3-12 and
accompanying text. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the majority
opinion was placing greater importance on the permit system than the Act's main goal
of elimination of pollution. 479 U.S. at 504 (Brennan, J. dissenting). See also infra
notes 129-38 and accompanying text.




complex nature of these decisions, the Act constitutes a delicate
balancing of the conflicting interests of the federal and state
governments, as well as of the conflicting interests among the
states."1
2
The Court reasoned that Congress must have crafted such
an intricate permit system because of a realization that huge
costs would necessarily be incurred before pollution could be
completely eliminated." 3 Therefore, the Court reasoned, Con-
gress must have realized that it was preempting the law of non-
source states when it enacted the 1972 Amendments."
4
The Court then gave two examples of how an affected state's
laws could undermine the Act's regulatory structure. First, a
non-source state's nuisance laws could "effectively override both
the permit requirements and the policy choices made by the
source state.""' 5 The threat of liability could result in indirect
regulation. By imposing its own nuisance laws on the discharger,
a non-source state could impose more stringent requirements on
the discharger's conduct than are imposed by its permit," 6 not-
withstanding the discharger's compliance with its permit." 7
The Court's second example of how non-source state laws
could upset the Act's regulatory structure involved a permit
holder who is subjected to the nuisance laws of several non-
source states - a situation which "would only exacerbate the
vagueness and resulting uncertainty"' 18 of the Act and render
meaningless any permit issued under it." 9 This, the Court held,
"would undermine the important goals of efficiency and pre-
dictability in the permit system."12
0
The Court concluded its preemption analysis by demonstrat-
ing why the source states laws were preserved by the Act's
savings clauses. The Court concluded that the source state's laws
do not "disrupt the regulatory partnership established by the
479 U.S. at 495.
" Id. at 494.
I" d. at 494-95.
"' Id. at 495.
6 Id.
479 U.S. at 495.
"' Id. at 496.
19 Id. at 497 (quoting 731 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984)).
11o Id. at 496.
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permit system." '1 2 1 Moreover, the source state's law "prevents a
source from being subject to an indeterminate number of poten-
tial regulations."'' 22 The Court concluded, therefore, that the
source state's law does not "stand as an obstacle to the full
implementation of the [Act]."123
The majority's analysis failed to distinguish between the
different types of remedies an injured party might seek under
the non-source state law. 124 Different remedies would affect the
polluter in varying degrees. Injunctions and punitive damages
clearly would regulate the source state in the impermissible man-
ner the court described. 25 On the other hand, compensatory
damages present a lesser threat to the federal scheme. 26 In fact,
compensatory damage suits, based on state common law could
"simultaneously promote [t]he main federal goal of eliminating
water pollution entirely . . . and obey [t]he congressional com-
mand to leave state common law intact." 1 27 The majority, in a
footnote, responded that "draw[ing] a line between the types of
relief sought . . . [might compel a polluter] to adopt different
or additional means of pollution control from those required by
the Act." 28 This conclusion clearly indicates the Court's extreme
reluctance to allow the states to interfere in any way with Con-
gressional intent.
B. Dissent
Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
an affected state's court must apply the source state's nuisance
121 Id. at 499.
122 Id.
23 479 U.S. at 494. International Paper also argued that the Act precluded courts
sitting in non-source states from adjudicating state-law suits, even under source state
law. The Court rejected this argument because "the rule is settled that a district court
sitting in diversity is competent to apply the law of a foreign State." Id. at 494-97.
1" Id. at 494-97. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 17-28, Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (No. 85-1233) [hereinafter Brief].
,21 See Brief, supra note 124, at 17-22.
12- See id.
,27 479 U.S. at 506 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
Energy Resources Cons. & Dev. Comm'n., 461 U.S. 190, 221-23 (1983)).
1 International Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 496 n.19 (1987).
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law.' 29 A main premise of his argument focused upon the ma-
jority's divergence from well-settled conflict-of-law principles.
130
Under most states' conflict-of-law rules, a court applies the tort
law of the state where the injury has occurred. 3 ' Justice Brennan
argued that the Clean Water Act provides no support for the
majority opinion's deviation. He defended his position with
language from the contested savings clause. The savings clauses
of section 510 states: "Except as expressly provided . . ., nothing
in this chapter shall . . . be construed as impairing or in any
manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with
respect to the water (including boundary waters) of such states." 32
Therefore, Brennan concluded, Congress would have specifically
preempted non-source state law if it actually intended to create
an aberration in well-settled conflict-of-law principles. 33
119 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, concurred in part
and dissented in part. The Justices agreed that International Paper's motion to dismiss
should be denied. However, the dissenters argued that the Court had improperly reached
out to decide the choice-of-law problem, because the plaintiff class had not based its
claims on any particular law. 479 U.S. at 501 (Brennan, J. dissenting). Justice Brennan
then took up the issue of state law and stated his differences with the majority opinion.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun,
joined the rest of the Court in denying International Paper's motion to dismiss. Agreeing
with Brennan, Justice Stevens stated that the majority had surpassed the issue at bar.
He believed the Court had merely issued an advisory opinion. He concluded by stating,
"One cannot help but wonder what has happened to the once respected doctrine of
judicial restraint." 479 U.S. at 509 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
110 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. A complete discussion of conflict-
of-law rules is beyond the scope of this Comment. Basically, states have adopted two
approaches that often give the same result. Justice Brennan outlined these two methods
in his dissent. 479 U.S. at 502. Both the traditional rule of lex loci delicti and the newer
interest analysis approach (which the Supreme Court applied in Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 309 (1981)) often reach the same result. Id.
In its analysis, the majority explicitly discounted the importance of choice-of-law
problems resulting from carrying out the objectives of Congress. 479 U.S. at 499. The
Court noted: "This interference would occur . . . whether affected-state law applies as
an original matter, or whether it applies pursuant to the source State's choice of law
principles. Therefore, if. . . the law of a source State requires the application of affected-
state substantive law . . . [then] it would be preempted as well." Id.
' See Brief supra note 124, at 7-8 & nn. 6-7 (quoting from International Paper's
oral argument in Vermont v. New York, 406 U.S. 186 (1972), 408 U.S. 917 (1972), 409
U.S. 1103 (1973)).
132 International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 503 (1987) (Brennan, J.
dissenting) (emphasis included) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1370) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
" 479 U.S. at 503-04. See 33 U.S.C. § 1322(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (a section
in which Congress expressly preempted states from adopting statutes).
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Since Brennan read Section 510 to preclude implicit preemp-
tion, he argued that the majority opinion had unjustifiably con-
tended that application of affected states' laws "stand [a]s an
obstacle to the full implementation of the Act."' 3 4 Moreover,
Brennan supported his counterargument with legislative his-
tory. 135
Brennan additionally contended that the Court should not
automatically preempt a state's law when it merely conflicts with
the federal law's subsidiary administrative objectives, but also
furthers the federal statute's primary purpose.' 36 A non-source
state has traditionally had an interest in protecting its citizens;
however, by subjecting polluters to state common law liability,
the non-source state law may conflict with the Act's permit
system. Yet, the liability imposed by the Act upon the polluter
should encourage him to reduce his pollution discharges. Hence,
while the non-source state law clashes with the administrative
permit system, the main federal goal of pollution elimination
has been furthered. Brennan concluded his argument by stating,
"Congress intended to stand by its federal regulatory scheme
and the State's traditional liability laws 'and to tolerate whatever
tension there was between them.' "'131 If Congress were to disa-




V. A PRACTICAL SOLUTION
International Paper demonstrates the difficulty faced by the
Supreme Court in trying to adhere to the fundamental doctrine
,3 479 U.S. at 504 (Brennan, J. dissenting). See supra note 129 and accompanying
text.
133 479 U.S. at 504, Brennan cited the same Senate Committee report that the
majority opinion cited. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. See also infra notes
141-43 and accompanying text (stating proposition that legislative history can generally
be used by two opposing sides to establish argument).
36 479 U.S. 505-06 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 221, 223)
(1983)).
"I International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 506 (1987) (quoting Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. at 256 (1984)).
M3' See 461 U.S. at 223 (stating that "[tihe courts should not assume the role which
our system assigns to Congress").
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of separation of powers while construing a highly ambiguous
piece of legislation. The Constitution limits the Court's authority
to "interpreting the laws and adjudicating disputes under
them."'3 9 The Court's efficiency in doing so is largely propor-
tional to Congress' ability to draft legislation in clear and precise
language.'4 Ambiguous language leaves the Court clouded in
uncertainty, but the Constitution mandates, nevertheless, that
the Court resolve the dispute at hand.
The Clean Water Act's savings clauses presented precisely
this sort of interpretive problem in International Paper, com-
pounded by the federalism implications of the Act's regulatory
scheme. For example, the vague savings clauses do not distin-
guish between interstate and intrastate disputes. Nor do they
distinguish between the different types of common law remedies
an injured party might seek.
When faced with situations of this nature, the Court nor-
mally looks at the statute's legislative history to aid in determin-
ing legislative intent. 41 This interpretive tool, however, can itself
present difficulties: 142 "As is frequently the case, legislative his-
tory yields contradictory indications which can be used to either
[party's] advantage."
43
The holding of International Paper clearly indicates the
Court's valiant effort to discern Congress' intent. The Court's
9 The separation of powers doctrine derives from the Constitution's tri-partite
division of federal power. U.S. CONST. art. I-III. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY defines the
doctrine in the following way:
The government . . . [is] divided into three . . . branches: the legislative,
which is empowered to make laws, the executive which is required to carry
out the laws, and the judicial which is charged with interpreting the laws
and adjudicating disputes under the laws. One branch is not permitted to
encroach on the domain of another.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (5th ed. 1979).
In application, however, "the concept of separation of powers is not one that is
capable of precise legal definition . . . [I]t does not yield clear solutions. NOwAR,
supra note 90, at 122.
110 See Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. RaV.
1, 32-39 (1985).
"I See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV.
1193, 1230-31 (1982).
"I Id. at 1231 (noting "[tihe more general and powerful the [legislative intent], the
less likely it is to have been stated explicitly by the legislature, even if the legislature in
fact shares that understanding.").
" ' Merrill, supra note 140, at 35.
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holding is consistent with the purposes and objectives of the
Clean Water Act, and with preserving state law except to the
extent it conflicts with the Act. Yet, by holding that Congress
intended to preempt non-source state laws, the Supreme Court
implicitly held that Congress had also created an exception to
well-settled conflict-of-law principles. Under International Pa-
per, a court must apply source state substantive law to a non-
source state injury.
The holding of International Paper discriminates against non-
source states. Congress easily could eliminate this discrimination
by adding a private cause of action to the Clean Water Act and
eliminate the savings clauses from it.
A uniform federal remedy would eliminate the need for
"judges ... to puzzle out what to do" with the Act's vague
saving clauses. 144 Congress should limit the type of available
relief to compensatory damages. This would result in the added
incentive of eliminating pollution more rapidly without upsetting
the present federal regulatory scheme. If Congress were to insert
a uniform federal remedy, the remedy could take into account
the side effects that different types of remedies offer. Further,
such federal legislation would erase the new exception to the
traditional conflict-of-law rules. By placing greater (but Con-
gressionally defined) risks on the pollutant dischargers, such an
amendment to the Act would also encourage dischargers to
reduce their discharge output, thereby advancing the very goal




Courts traditionally have had difficulty resolving interstate
water pollution disputes. The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 exacerbated already existing confusion.
The Amendments did change the Act into a comprehensive water
pollution abatement program, 46 but unfortunately Congress failed
- Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking - Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who
Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 792-93 (1963).
141 See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 3-12 and accompanying text.
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to include a provision granting an express statutory private cause
of action under the Act.
The Act's two savings clauses purport to preserve a means
by which an injured party may obtain redress under state law.
However, the provisions do not explicitly state which state laws
the Act preserves. Thus, courts interpreted the provisions differ-
ently after the 1972 Amendments were passed.
47
In International Paper the Supreme Court interpreted the
clauses to preserve the law of the state where pollution origi-
nates. But the Court held that the Act does preempt the law of
a state where harm occurs, because application of the state's
law would undermine the Act's regulatory structure. 148 Hence,
the Act discriminates against non-source states and permit schemes
by rendering them virtually powerless to deal with polluting
damage to their territory and their citizens from sources beyond
their borders.
International Paper may mark the end of a long history of
confusion in the regulation of interstate water pollution. On the
other hand, its holding illuminates a serious flaw in the way
Congress has chosen to attack this problem. By eliminating the
Act's savings clauses and creating a statutory private cause of
action instead, Congress could eliminate that flaw.
GENIE B. WHITESELL
See supra notes 31-35, 37, 60-66, 68-78 and accompanying text.
, See supra text accompanying notes 97-120.
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